A Desk Review Report on

The
SOUTHERN KaduNa
Conflict

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Introduction

The Southern Kaduna conflict has become one of the pressing challenges in Nigeria given its protraction and intractability. Successive governments have grappled with ending the conflict through a series of inquiries and white papers following recommendations from inquiries. However, the conflict has become dauntinggiven that its triggers are often far removed from its underlying causes. It is for this reason that it has become imperative to critically reflect on these causes and develop sustainable long-term solutions. Hence the relevance of this report.

This report identifies four key issues in the Southern Kaduna conflict. The first issue is local governance. This report traces the antecedence of the conflict from a governance perspective considering how the conflict has evolved as an attrition in local administration.
The second issue identified in this report is ethno-religious intolerance. As an ethno-religious concern, this report discusses the conflict as a contestation between religious groupings along variegated cultural lines. This report cites examples of this intolerance and analyses the adequacy of past measures taken to address this concern.

As an access to resources concern, this report discusses how the co-existence of the diametrical economic patterns within the region has given rise to tensions bothering on resource control. This is reflected mostly in factual clashes between herdsmen and farmers in the region. Heaving concerns of environmental conditions within the region also fosters this concern.

Fourth, this report discusses the conflict from the perspective of socio-economic opportunities relating to youth unemployment and infrastructural development given that these issues often resonate from the narrative of the conflict.

Overall, this report advances strategies that can be adopted in addressing the crisis drawing on the state of the conflict and past interventions.

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
This report draws on primary and secondary data. Previous field studies conducted on the Southern Kaduna conflict were utilised. Key among these are: *Observations and recommendations drawn from an analytical study of reports of commissions of inquiry and government white papers on various conflicts in Southern Kaduna State* (report prepared by Dr. Abubakar Siddique Mohammed) and *Tackling Inter-Ethnic Conflict in Southern Kaduna: A Desk-Review of the Conflict.* (report prepared by Mr. ChomBagu). This research further draws on an analysis of government information including white papers, reports and perspectives garnered from media sources.

Key issues in the Southern Kaduna conflict

Aside from being a geographic entity, the Southern Kaduna region has become an expression of contestations. There are four important dimensions integral to an understanding of the conflict in the region. The first is the issue of local governance; the second is ethno-religious intolerance. The third and fourthissues relate to access to resources andsocio-economic opportunities. However, before considering these issues, it is useful to synopsise the geographic character of the Southern Kaduna region.

Southern Kaduna is located in the southern hemisphere of Kaduna State. It comprises of more than 50 ethnic groups including Hausa/Fulani populations that are also mostly in the northern region of Kaduna State. 8 out of 23 local governments are in the Southern Kaduna region, namely, Kajuru, Zagon-Kataf, Jema'a, Kaura, Kagarko, Chikun, Kachia and Jaba. Climatically, it has drawn a mix of both agrarian and nomadic populations and has been a trading hub for centuries given the commercial activities in the region that dates to pre-colonial times. With the influx of various populations, it has acquired an ethnically diverse character and evolved in traditional governance from the time of the Zazzau Empire to post-colonial Nigeria.

In modern history, the region has gained significant attention, due, in part, to the surging conflicts that dates over the last three decades and has assumed a character of intractability. Between 1980 and 2012, at least 35 crises were reported in Kaduna State. The pertinent challenge faced by successive governments has been how to address its intractable nature given that it has emerged as one of the current pressing challenges in need of sustainable solutions. In proposing solutions, however, it is important to understand the nature of the conflict. The next section considers the key issues at the core of the conflict.

1. AS Mohammed *Observations and recommendations drawn from an analytical study of reports of commissions of inquiry and government white papers on various conflicts in Southern Kaduna State* (2017) 4.

2. C Bagu *Challenges of sharing the green grass: the anatomy of violence in Southern Kaduna* (2017) 1.

3. Nasir El-Rufai on The Southern Kaduna Crisis (February 2017).

Local governance

Integral to an understanding of the conflict in Southern Kaduna is the history of contestation of local governance within the region. This history often reverberates in the discourse of the Southern Kaduna conflict as an enduring crisis or an 'age-long deep-seated mutual hate and animosity' which needs to be isolated from pockets of violence. While this account dates to the pre-colonial activities of the Zazzau Empire, its proximate history dates to the sub-colonial rule introduced by the British through the infamous indirect rule system.

By administrate fiat in the 1900s, the existing local governance structures of ethnic populations in the region was reformed. The new system of governance brought ethnic groups within the Southern Kaduna area under the ruler-ship of the Zazzau-caliphate of the Hausa/Fulani populations. Given that there was an established system of emirate governance under the caliphate, it was administratively convenient for the colonial rulers to govern other ethnic groups with diverse structures within a homogenous governance structure. However, this order brewed tensions as it was used to entrench inequality and given that it eroded the hard-won victories of many of the ethnic groups against the rule of the Zazzau caliphate that had previously subjugated them to tribute-paying vassals and as slaves.

However, in the 1920s, Hugh Clifford, who at the time was Governor of Nigeria, proposed a reform predicated on 'scaling back the use of Hausa and Fulani district chiefs in non-Muslim districts, where their presence might cause resentment.' In 1931, a similar form of reform was sought to be established by Donald Cameron who became the governor of Nigeria in 1931, however, it was met with resistance from the Zazzau emirate as an effort that would jeopardise 'the entire edifice of proxy British rule in the province.' In revolt, a series of protests against the emirate rule emerged beginning from the 1940s. In 1945 and 1946, for instance, the Kagoma people remonstrated against the suzerainty of the Jema'aemirate demanding a Kagoma chief. The Fatsuam in Kachanfan were equally vocal against this governance and demanded the removal of appointed heads by the Jema'aemirate, which was a vassal State of the Zazzau caliphate. In this period, many of the non-Hausa/Fulani population in the region embraced Christianity and with time, religion also became a rallying point for their struggle. For instance, in 1949, semi-educated groups from Southern Kaduna formed the Northern Nigeria Non-Muslim League which 'attracted large following and sympathy because of its anti-Hausa/Fulani campaign.' The conflation of the struggle with religion expanded the reach of the organisation (which later became the Middle Zone League and Middle Belt Movement) to other non-Muslim ethnic groups beyond Southern Kaduna in a unified counter-hegemonic writhe against the Hausa/Fulani native authorities.

Following Nigeria's independence, Sir Ahmadu Bello (who had been the Minister of Local Government in the 1950s and had understood the counter-hegemonic struggle) sought to absorb the non-Muslim ethnic populations into existing governance structures as Premier of Northern Nigeria. While successive governments have equally sought to address local governance structures through the creation of local governments and chiefdoms, the age-long presence of perceived dominance has fueled deep-set grievances that need to be addressed. A notable manifestation of this was with the May 1992 crisis in ZangoKataf. The direct cause of this crisis was that crops were uprooted on Hausa farmlands by the Katafs which caused the former to, in turn, uproot crops from Kataf farmlands in the ZangoKatafdistrict. Remotely, however, this conflict was precipitated by a revolt against what the Katafs perceived as dominance by the emirate council.

S Kolawole *"On the bloodbath in Southern Kaduna"* This Day 29 January 2017.

IS Ladan-Baki 'Interfaith conflict and political development in Nigeria: the ZangonKataf conflict' (2015) *2(4) Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences* 174, 175.

ME Ochonu *Colonialism by proxy: Hausa imperial agents and middle belt consciousness in Nigeria* 67.
As above, 71.

HB Yusuf 'Managing Muslim-Christian conflicts in Northern Nigeria: a case study of Kaduna state' (2007) 18(2) *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 237, 242.

MD Suleiman 'Southern Kaduna: democracy and the struggle for identity and independence by non-Muslim communities in Northern Nigeria 1999-2011' Paper presented at the 34th AFSAAP Conference, Flinders University, Adelaide, South Australia (2011) 6.
As above, 8.

MAB Gaiya and JS Rengshwat 'Scottish missionaries in Central Nigeria' in A Adogame and A Lawrence (eds) *Africa in Scotland, Scotland in Africa: historical legacies and contemporary hybridities*(2014) 263, 264.

I Mu'azzam and J Ibrahim 'Religious identity in the context of structural adjustment in Nigeria' in A Jega (ed) I*dentity transformation and identity politics under structural adjustment in Nigeria* (2000) 62, 74.
Suleiman (n 9 above) 8.

Local governance

In a letter by eight Kataf Village Heads and Elders on 21 April 1992, this perception was detailed. Specifically, in paragraph 3 of the letter, the Katafs mentioned that they sought to 'take back the ownership' of farmlands that 'were confiscated by the Emirate Council through the … Hausa District Head of ZangoKataf and shared out to their kiths and kins'.

The resultant effect of the unresolved perception of dominance, in more recent times, has been two-fold. First, there have been allegations of nepotism when it comes to political appointments, distribution of power and local government administration.Up until 1995, for instance, District Heads in many localities across Southern Kaduna were appointed by the Zaria Emir. Successive governments have been accused of perpetuating this practice through sustained suzerainty. Under the military regime, for instance, there were often only 2out of 18 commissioners appointed from Southern Kaduna and as such 'clearly overlooking the population parity between north and Southern Kaduna'. This allegation has resonated in civil service appointments. It has been observed, for instance, that when directorship positions are vacant, appointments are often done along religious lines. In the government White Paper on theviolence that occurred in 2000, this was one of the causes of the conflict that was highlighted. The Committee of Inquiry set up to consider the crisis, recommended that the government had to take existing diversity in the region into account in its conduct. However, thisalleged practice of nepotism was a contributory factor to the 2011 post-election violence significantly in the resistance against electoral officials by ethnic populations to secure the victory of the Late Governor Patrick Ibrahim Yakowa.

Another effect of the unresolved perception of dominance has been the practice of excluding Hausa/Fulani groups in local governance within Southern Kaduna based on an indigene/settler divide. Regarded as 'foreigners' or 'settlers', the Hausa/Fulani population, are, in many instances, not recognised as legitimate members of Chiefdom communities in the Southern Kaduna region. They are sometimes excluded from participation in local governance within communities that they have inhabited even prior to other ethnic groups. During the 2011 General Elections for instance, election officials sent to Southern Kaduna were chased out in some parts in a bid to prevent Hausa/Fulani communities from voting. Hausa/Fulani populations have in turn demanded creation of Chiefdoms within various communities in view of the perceived exclusions, however, this has only fostered divisiveness within the region with both groups mutually ostracising each other. Mutual labeling has become an expression of this ostracisation. While Hausa/Fulani populations perceive that they are regarded as settlers, ethnic populations in the region perceive that they are dubbed as 'arna' by Hausa/Fulani populations – a term, which is considered offensive, given its historical connotations. The mutual remonstrations between the groups in the region have become a revolving plot of contestation over local governance, which left unresolved, fans the member of conflict.

Kaduna State of Nigeria *Report of ZangonKataf (Market) Riots and Subsequent Riots Judicial Commission of Inquiry* (September 1992) 16.

As above, 27.
Bagu (n 2 above) 12.
As above.
As above.
Mohammed (n 1 above) 45.
As above, 46
As above, 72.
Mohammed (n 1 above) 64.
Mohammed (n 1 above) 64.

The indigene/settler dichotomy implies that Hausa/Fulani populations in the region are constricted in the exercise of socio-economic and political freedoms. This has also begun to affect their right to culture. While the emirate system is merely ceremonial and a reflection of cultural history, ethnic communities within the region have sought to do away with them completely. For instance, ethnic communities in Jema'a want the emirate dissolved even though the emirate has been stripped of all non-Hausa and non-Fulani territories. This has equally sparked reactions from the Hausa/Fulani populations.

Mohammed (n 1 above) 72.
Mohammed (n 1 above) 65.

Ethno-religious intolerance

The first notable manifestation of the Southern Kaduna conflict as an ethno-religious concern was in the 1987 Kafanchan College crisis. While religious undertones had erstwhile motioned remonstrations against native administrative authorities during the colonial era, it assumed a violent dimension in March of 1987. On 5 March 1987, it was time for the Christian students at the Kafanchan College of Education to host the annual Mission 87 in Kaduna. As part of the publicity and welcoming strategy, the Christian students mounted a banner in front of the college against which Muslim students protested. In an effort to quell the protest, the authorities of the college put down the banner. The following day, a remonstration occurred over an alleged misinterpretation of Quranic texts by a preacher who formerly being Muslim converted to the Christian faith. This led to a protest march the next day by Muslim Students around Kafanchan town, which was a largely Christian settlement with a Muslim minority. A fracas quickly erupted in the town, which led to a significant loss of life and property on the Muslim side. Reports of the incidence spread quickly to other parts of Kaduna and while the State Governor was brandishing his statement, a widespread rampage occurred. By the end of the crisis, churches and mosques were destroyed. Private buildings were attacked and a significant number of lives were lost.

In response, the government instituted a commission of inquiry to consider the matter. While religious intolerance was significantly highlighted as a concern that needed to be addressed, the approach the State Government sought to adopt in the White Paper to tackle the challenge was problematic for two reasons. First, it failed to address concerns relating to the alleged perception that the state was tilting towards a religion. On the issue of Sharia Law, the State Government noted that there was a 'high tension generated' in the national discourse on its application. However, this was downplayed though the government recognised that this 'kind of tension has long since been very much with us and had been one of the remote causes of the recent riots and disturbances in some parts of Kaduna State.' Rather than critically regarding this issue, the government seemed to disregard the tension maintaining that the tension was due to 'misinformation and lack of information and the way and manner in which both parties approached the matter in direct confrontation with each other without on the contrary properly articulating their cases on either side dispassionately.' Consequently, this issue was not effectively redressed. Second, the State Government did not properly articulate the position of the 1979 Constitution, which separates religion from the State. This approach, in part, was informed by the recommendation of the 1987 Committee, which recommended that secularism (which was not found in the Constitution) should be discouraged. However, the 1987 Committee seemed to have misdirected itself on the interpretation of section 10 of the 1979 Constitution. While seeking to 'bridge the communication gap between Muslims and Christians at all levels for the greater good' of the people in the State, the State Government decided to seriously enhance religious teaching at all levels, hence, interfering in religion which in the first place was the reason for the conflict.

The ripple effect of the missed opportunity of delineating the role of the State from religion in line with the constitution was at the root of the religious violence in 2000. Following the decision of the State Government to introduce Sharia Law in parts of the State in early 2000, a crisis erupted in various parts including the southern region. Although the law seeks to guide justice administration with respect to Muslims in the State, its introduction was perceived as an affirmation of the dominance of the Hausa/Fulani population and as an imposition of religion by the State. Consequently, lives and properties were lost. Another Commission of inquiry was set up in 2000 to ascertain the cause of the riot, determine the losses and make appropriate recommendations.

J Ibrahim 'The politics of religion in Nigeria: the parameters of the 1987 crisis in Kaduna State' (1989) 45/46 Review of African Political Economy 65-67.

Mu'azzam and Ibrahim (n 12 above) 69.

T Falola *Violence in Nigeria: the crisis of religious politics and secular ideologies* (1998) 183.

MT Ladan 'The role of youth in inter-ethnic and religious conflicts: the Kaduna/Kano case study' in EE Uwazie, IO Albert and GN Uzoigwe (eds) *Inter-ethnic and religious conflict resolution in Nigeria* (1999) 104.

Ethno-religious intolerance

The Commission emphasised that it was imperative that the 'diversity of the people should be taken into account in the Conduct of Government Affairs.' The Commission noted that the conflicts 'brought in their trail intolerance, hatred, enmity, suspicion and mistrust in the minds of the young and old' and that there was a perception that government actions and policies were along ethno-religious lines. In its decision, the government agreed to employ the '[full weight of the public relations machinery of the government'. However, the decision does not set out a clear plan for doing this nor is there an articulation of what this will achieve.

In reality, the perceptions of ethno-religious fragmentations have continued to persist. This was one of the remote causes of the 2011 post-election violence. In its White Paper, the State Government observed that the 'adherents of the two religions since the 2000 Shari'ah crisis have been suspicious of each other hence settlements like "Muslim Rigasa" and "Christian Rigasa" in Kaduna.' While noting that this has made it 'easy for any form of disagreement to degenerate into religious crisis' the State Government directed the Bureau for Religious Affairs to liaise with both the Christian and Muslim associations and 'properly monitor and regulate the activities of religious bodies and preachers.' However, the opportunity is yet missed to articulate secularism as a defining principle for State actions going forward given that there is a deep mistrust of State authorities as neutral agents in building lasting peace and sustaining solutions.

Mohammed (n 1 above) 44.

Kaduna State of Nigeria *White paper on the report of Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Kaduna State religious disturbances of February 2000* (2001) 2.

As above, 2.
As above, 3.

This has arisen in interviews with 'key informants' from various parts of Kaduna including political officers, government officials, professionals and civil society. These informants have argued that the conflict in Southern Kaduna is significantly ethno-religious. Bagu (n 2 above) 12.

Kaduna State Government *White Paper on the report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Presidential Election Disturbances in Kaduna State* (2011) 15-16.

As above, 16.
As above, 144.

Access to resources

The popular narrative of this dimension of the conflict is of an attrition between herders and farmers over land and water sources in Southern Kaduna districts. More generally, this also extends to the North-Central parts of Nigeria including Benue and Plateau States. The pattern of the narrative, which often precedes conflict, is that herders enter farmlands with livestock and destroy crops. On the other hand, farmers are accused of preventing animals from grazing, chasing herders and in certain instances, killing livestock. This was the narrative around the unresolved dispute that started in the Ninte district of the Godogodo Chiefdom in Jema'a Local Government in May 2016 that triggered inter-communal clashes and eventually led to the loss of lives and properties. From October to December 2016, about 204 people were killed in districts along Southern Kaduna in reprisal and counter-reprisal attacks between farmers and herdsmen. These attacks have also been compounded by reprisals from Fulani transhumance from countries outside Nigeria who (due to unresolved animosities and losses suffered during the 2011 presidential post-election violence) have allegedly attacked ethnic populations in the region.

In response to the transhumance attacks, the Kaduna StateGovernment decidedto pay compensation to Fulani herdsmen. While this decision was based on the recommendation of the Agwai Committee, it has been heavily criticised as a cultivation of violence, not least, as it has done little to end the conflict. In 2016, the Federal government proposed grazing reserves to provide for and foster the management of grazing reserves across Nigeria. This was driven, in part, by the need to address clashes between farmers and herdsmen, however, the proposal was rejected, not least, because many States were wary about its impact within the larger society. In Southern Kaduna, this was rejected as 'a deliberate attempt to alienate the people' in the region by the government.

While the intention of the proposed legislation is to manage the recurring crisis between herdsmen and farmers, such intentions will hardly resonate with local populations or realise its objective if a long-term strategy is not developed for managing the ecological changes that may affect access to resources. The importance of this strategy is two-fold. First, resources in these communities are being depleted from excessive grazing and over cultivation. Second, there is an onset of climate change within the region, which will invariably affect the availability of agricultural resources. In building peace between herdsmen and farmers, it is important to seek joint strategies for fostering access to resources for livestock and agricultural uses.

Nigerian Senate Interim report of the Senate Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Kaduna crisis and other parts of the country (2017) 3.

G Muhammad 'Nigerian govt says 204 killed in Southern Kaduna crisis' Premium Times 10 July 2017.

'We've paid some Fulani to stop killings in Southern Kaduna – El-Rufai' Vanguard 3 December 2016.

Socio-economic opportunities

Another dimension to the conflict is lack of access to socio-economic opportunities. This is in two-fold. The first relates to youth unemployment. Youth unemployment is a significant challenge in Nigeria. Nearly 50 percent of Nigeria's youth population are recorded to be unemployed. This challenge creates a plethora of problems. First, it affects the effective growth and development of the country's economy and its posterity. Second, it heightens the possibility of crime given that the agility of the young population is not effectively harnessed to foster a common good. The negative effect of youth unemployment has been a significant challenge in parts of the country for decades. In Southern Kaduna, this has given rise to banditry activities in the Northern region. In the Southern part, it has fanned arbitrary killings. In a plethora of investigations over the years into the loss of lives and properties, this has emerged as a cause of the conflict that needs to be addressed. While the Southern Kaduna government has equally recognised this, there is yet to be a clear strategy on how to address this challenge in the context of the conflict. Although the Government has sought to address this through vocational education, it is imperative for the State to create spaces for youth-driven economic growth in the Southern Kaduna region. As such, an emphasis must be on skill development to fit existing sectors and newly created ones. However, this cannot be done without actual statistics on the demographic distribution. As such, it is important to develop data for a strategic plan of addressing youth unemployment within the region. A top-bottom approach should, however, be avoided.

The second dimension to the conflict relates to unequal infrastructural development between the Northern and Southern parts of Kaduna. The 1987 Committee recognised this as one of the remote causes of the Kafanchan crisis. The Committee recommended that the State Government should provide infrastructural development to the Southern part and set in place mechanisms for fostering equal opportunities in addressing the perceived imbalance between the two regions. However, this is still a prevalent reality in Southern Kaduna that has inspired deep-set grievances against the North, which is predominantly Hausa/Fulani. What this rhetoric does to the conflict is that it fuels distrust and makes any effort geared at addressing the crisis led by the population perceived as fostering marginalisation seem pretentious. Hence, it is important for the State to take conscious efforts to ensure infrastructural development at par with the Northern part of the State. This assertion does not deny the fact that the State has not already taken commendable efforts. What is implied, however, is that sustaining solutions to the crisis requires that the perceived socio-economic inequality is redressed. However, it is pertinent to redress this through a people-oriented approach that focuses on the needs of the Southern Kaduna population and develops their capacities to advance the development

Mohammed (n 1 above) 17.
As above, 19.

Past interventions

One of the main interventions of the State following conflict has been the creation of commissions of inquiries.

Following the 1987 Kafanchan conflict, a Commission of Inquiry was inaugurated to consider the religious violence. The Committee recognised that there was an existing mistrust between Hausa/Fulani and other ethnic groups in the region owing to allegations of cultural and political dominance. The Committee further noted that Southern Kaduna areas were being left out of infrastructural development. Politically, there were also allegations of marginalisation in the appointment of village heads. Local populations felt exploited by the Zaria Emirate and there were grievances against the Jema'a Emirate. Religious intolerance was also noted as a cause of the conflict. And while it was the main trigger for the crisis, the Committee recommended that the government should (in addition to fostering tolerance) seek to build up trust between the local communities and ensure infrastructural development in Southern Kaduna areas.

Notably, the Committee proposed that a mechanism for equitable redress of grievances should be developed to ensure that Southern Kaduna people have access to equal opportunities. Politically, the Committee recommended that more local governments be developed to foster an inclusive form of government. While the Kaduna State Government created five more local governments, other structural problems were not adequately addressed such as the deep-set bitterness against the political dominance of the Zaria Emirate and the religious intolerance between ethnic groups and Hausa/Fulani populations, which was also recognised as one of the remote causes of the ZangonKataf, riot in 1992.

As with the 1987 Committee, the 1992 Committee set up to investigate the ZangonKataf riot emphasised, among other things, that religious intolerance and mistrust were remote root causes of the ZangonKataf riot. The 1992 Committee recommended that the labeling of non-Muslims as 'arna', 'kafiri' or 'kafirai' must be stopped 'in view of their derogatory meaning, even if not intended' given that these words had been 'commonly used from time immemorial'. However, as they aroused sensitivities, it was imperative that such labeling must be stopped and the ethnic Kataf and Hausa communities strive towards religious tolerance. But the report of the Committee had barely been finalised when another riot broke out in the same district in May 1992 and subsequently led to an extension of the mandate of the 1992 Committee. An additional report was developed in September 1992, which notably called for intolerance to be eschewed.

However, despite the recommendations in these reports and another set of recommendations from the Committee for Reconciliation and Search for Lasting Peace in ZangonKataf in 1995 which advocated for tolerance and prompt response to crisis triggers, religious violence reoccurred in 2000 with the proposed introduction of Sharia Law. As with the past, another Committee was established to consider this violence. This Committee emphasised similar patterns of intolerance and deep-set grievance over local governance and emphasised the need for trust to be built as with diversity to be reflected in government plans.

Past interventions

However, future conflict occurrences in Kamuru and Gwantu towns simply echoed a revolving plot of intolerance of an ethnic and religious nature. During the 2011 post-election violence, the conflict became part of a broader political violence along party lines following 2011 presidential election. While the election results were an immediate trigger, the unresolved ethno-religious acrimonies were remote causes as with the large number of unemployed youth and contestations over local governance. As with the report of the 2011 Committee, these causes were equally identified in the report of the 2015 Committee to Stamp Out Attacks on Southern Kaduna Communities. Despite these inquiries, the conflict has continued to persist, due, in part, to the fact that these recommendations are not always implemented and effective monitoring and evaluation processes are not put in place. Aside from government-led inquiries, other notable interventions include the 2016 Kafanchan Peace Declaration brokered by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in partnership with the Kaduna State Government; the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme, which sought to foster dialogue through dialogue and the fact-finding mission/intervention of the Nigerian Bar Association. However, much of these interventions have been short-lived without adequate monitoring mechanisms.

Strategies for addressing the conflict

Having identified key issues in the Southern Kaduna conflict, it is imperative to discuss concrete strategies for addressing the conflict.

Strategies on the issue of local governance

On the issue of local governance, it is important for the State to address the triggers of perceptions of dominance among ethnic groups. Some of these triggers include land administration, impunity and religion. It is imperative to conduct a comprehensive study of the triggers of these perceptions drawing on perspectives of various ethnic communities and specific groups including women, children and persons with disabilities.

Negative labeling should also be addressed. Words such as 'agwoi', 'arna' and 'bakomaragari' must be prohibited. Also, the indigene/settler divide must be addressed through education of local communities on constitutional provisions and fundamental human rights principles.

Strategies on the issue of ethno-religious Intolerance

On the issue of ethno-religious intolerance, dialogue and education are essential. However, beyond these, it is important for three key strategies to be adopted. First, the State should launch and incentivise community cohesion projects. The success of these projects in bridging divides over a given period should be rewarded through an evaluative strategy. Second, a manual be developed on signs of ethno-religious intolerance drawing on past experiences and actor-oriented approach. This manual should further chronicle key measures on how to address these intolerances based on past approaches and drawing on relevant norms. This manual must be well suited to the lingua of local populations.

On an institutional level, existing institutions within the State that promote tolerance must be given feasibility. In addition, a council of elders that include Muslims, Christians, Hausa/Fulani and ethnic populations should be inaugurated. This council should be composed of reputable individuals within the State and should be drawn from a wide range of sectors. The aim of this council will be to monitor ethno-religious intolerance, identify hotspots and commune with local communities through open processes. In the alternative, an early warning and response system may be created to identify, prevent and respond quickly and effectively to intolerances that may emerge as with its consequences.

Strategies on the issue of access to resources

With respect to access to resources, there are two key strategies that should be advanced. As the attrition relates to ownership and use of land between pastoralists and farmers, it is essential for agricultural territories within the region to be mapped out and for local communities to agree on grazing areas through broad-based consultation. However, this cannot be done through a top-bottom approach. As such, the only intervention of the State should be facilitating meaningful dialogue. Given the impact of climate change, it is important for adaptation and mitigation strategies to be developed within the region. As the attrition further extends to activities of transhumance, it is essential that a regional action plan for the implementation of the ECOWAS Decision Relating to the Regulations on Transhumance between ECOWAS Member States should be developed to manage movement of transhumance and chart a new course that is both responsive to grazing needs and the interest of agrarian communities.

Strategies on the issue of socio-economic opportunities

In ensuring socio-economic opportunities, there are two strategies that need to be adopted. With respect to youth unemployment, it is important for data be developed highlighting key points such as youth population without employment and those at various stages and sectors of employment. This is important in developing short and long-term policy on realising meaningful employment within the region. It is imperative, however, that this process is participatory. With respect to infrastructural development, it is essential that data is generated on infrastructural conditions in various districts of Southern Kaduna. Given the agrarian and pastoralist nature of local populations in the region, it is essential for socio-economic development to equally correspond to their needs through broad-based engagements that is engendered.

Overall, there is a need for effective monitoring and evaluation of these strategies given that most of the interventions from prior initiatives have fallen through due to the absence of adequate long-term monitoring and evaluation processes.